The International Dimensions of the New Transnational Repression by Cooley, Alexander A.
 
“The International Dimensions of the New Transnational Repression” 
 
Written Testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
“Tools of Transnational Repression” 
 
September 12, 2019 
 
Alexander Cooley 
Director of the Harriman Institute for the Study of Russia, Eurasia and Eastern Europe, Columbia 





Chairman Hastings, Co-Chairman Wicker and Members of the Commission, 
 
Thank you for inviting me to testify about the topic of transnational repression as part of the 
hearing on reforming INTERPOL. I request that my written testimony be admitted into the 
record. 
 
My aim today is to explain why autocrats are increasingly projecting their reach overseas and 
highlight how INTERPOL has become a weapon in their efforts to target exiled political 
opponents. The TRAP Act is a critical tool to safeguard human rights in the international 
policing organization and to provide principled leadership that counters alarming transnational 
trends. 
 
What is Transnational Repression? 
 
By “transnational repression” I refer to the targeting of co-national political opponents, civil 
society advocates, non-pliant business community members and journalists who reside abroad by 
governments and their internal security and intelligence services.   
 
These extraterritorial acts of repression include, but may not be limited to: 
 
• Coercive acts against political exiles by security services and their agents, including 
assassination attempts, disappearances, forced abductions and renditions back to the 
home country. 
• Active monitoring, infiltration and disruption of diaspora and exile communities abroad. 
• Harassment and intimidation of an exiled political opponent’s family members in the 
home state in order to deter political activities abroad. 
• Restricting overseas travel and professional activities. 
• Cooperation between the security services of a host and sending country to deny exiles 
due process and/or bypass legal proceedings that would determine eligibility for political 
asylum. 
 
Transnational repression is certainly not new. Dictators across the globe historically have sought 
to extend their reach by targeting political opponents abroad—for example, following the 1917 
revolution, Soviet security services were tasked with hunting down political exiles and emigres, 
including the operation, ordered by Stalin, that in 1940 assassinated Leon Trotsky in Mexico 
City.1  Cooperation among authoritarian security services also has precedent, most notably the 
Operation Condor network under which six Latin American dictatorships in the 1970s targeted a 
common list of communists and political opponents throughout the continent.2 
 
But the rise of this new wave of transnational repression—through the 2000s and 2010s—within 
the era of globalization does have some distinctive drivers and new dynamics.  
 
Characteristics of Today’s Transnational Repression: Exiles, Diasporas and IT 
 
First, transnational repression is an outcome of the recent global backlash against 
democratization.3 The democratic optimism of the 1990s and early 2000s, when it appeared that 
democratic norms and practices were spreading irreversibly worldwide, has given way to the 
emergence of a more aggressive and savvier breed of autocrat. The so-called Color Revolutions 
of the mid-2000s in Eurasia and the Arab Spring in the Middle East have prompted 
authoritarians to reframe democratic opponents, civil society activists and even journalists as 
security threats intent on destabilizing and disrupting their autocratic rule. As political opponents 
flee these crackdowns, autocrats now aggressively pursue these exiles overseas in an attempt to 
deny them safe spaces from which they can organize, broadcast oppositional media and question 
their home government’s legitimacy.  Emboldened autocrats have taken advantage of overly 
broad counterterrorism and counterextremism measures to rebrand exiled political opponents as 
extremists, while dozens of countries have introduced new restrictions on the scope of activities 
and the foreign funding sources of civil society organizations,4 such as Russia’s “Foreign 
Agents” (2012) and “Undesirable Organizations” (2015) laws.5  
 
Second, globalization has created new diaspora communities of economic migrants. For 
example, since the early 2000s the authoritarian post-Soviet Central Asian states have sent 
millions of migrants to Russia.  Though at first they may not be politically active in the affairs of 
their home states, over time and as they vie for protections, social rights and/or become 
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radicalized, these communities are perceived as threatening by authoritarian regimes. Cheap 
international transportation links and low-cost communications technologies allow for regular 
contacts and the transmission of information, ideas and values between economic diaspora and 
their home countries. Uzbekistan’s former strongman President Islam Karimov, fearing their 
radicalization, viewed these diasporas with great suspicion, even as his security services 
cooperated with Russian counterparts to monitor them.  Home countries may also actively 
exploit and intimidate their diasporas to ensure political loyalty and cultivate a network of 
embedded informants. For example, in Africa, the Eritrean government, with a large diaspora 
population in Europe and North America, has aggressively collected a so-called “diaspora tax,” 
using the threat of withholding legal services as leverage in their collection efforts.6 
 
Third, the rise of new digital and information technologies—including social media—offers new 
tools to the security services of authoritarians to monitor, survey and infiltrate beyond borders.  
Historically, information technologies were viewed as inherent facilitators of free speech and 
activism across borders. This assumption was reinforced by the important role played by social 
media in networking and organizing activist street protests during the Arab Spring of 2011-2012. 
However, authoritarians have responded by extending their control of the information space 
beyond their territorial borders and into transnational spaces used for anti-regime activities.  
Sociologist Dana Moss has shown how the Syrian government used new technological tools to 
survey the online communications and social media profiles of activist exiles in the United States 
and United Kingdom, disrupt and damage online platforms and anti-government websites, and 
intimidate outspoken regime critics with electronic messages and the collection of their personal 
information.7   
 
Authoritarian Cooperation, Learning and the Breakdown of International Democratic 
Norms 
 
New transnational repression is also taking place more openly in an international environment 
where liberal democratic norms are weakening. Autocrats are actively cooperating with one 
another and learning how to successfully repurpose international institutions to avoid 
international scrutiny and accountability for human rights abuses. 
 
Some of this authoritarian cooperation has been formalized within international and regional 
organizations. For example, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)– comprised of 
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and, since 2017, India and 
Pakistan– maintains a common blacklist of individuals and organization under the auspices of its 
Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS). Though the list is officially meant to target the 
“three evils” of extremism, terrorism, and separatism, in practice human rights organizations 
have noted that member country regimes use the SCO blacklist to deny each other’s political 
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exiles and regime opponents regional safe harbor and asylum.8 In just one decade, the list of 
blacklisted individuals and organizations has exploded––from 15 organizations and 400 
individuals in 2006, to 42 organizations and 1,100 in 2010, to 69 organizations and 2,500 
individuals 2016––while courts in member countries– such as Kazakhstan– have cited the SCO 
Treaty as the legal basis for extraditing political asylum-seekers and exiles back to countries that 
routinely practice torture. 9 A former UN special rapporteur on Counterterrorism and Human 
Rights publicly voiced concern about the organization’s overly broad definition of the “three 
evils,” its practice of unconditional extradition, and its opaque data-sharing and classification 
practices.10  
 
Authoritarians and their security services are also informally cooperating and emulating one 
another’s successful repressive tactics.  Over the last few years, China has pressured 
governments as far afield as Egypt, Cambodia, Kenya and Thailand to deport asylum-seeking 
Uighurs. At the same time, as part of an aggressive global anti-corruption campaign, China has 
sent operatives overseas to harass economic fugitives, while pressuring their family members 
back in China to persuade them to return.11 As you will hear in more detail, Turkey has 
conducted overseas security operations against regime opponents in Kosovo and attempted, with 
mixed success, to leverage its economic and cultural ties to the Central Asian states to demand 
the closure of Gülen-affiliated schools and the extradition of anti-regime critics. And even the 
usually reliably democratic country of Georgia appears to have succumbed to pressure from its 
more powerful neighbor Azerbaijan by allowing, and even assisting in, the abduction of 
journalists and dissidents from within its territory.12 
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The watering down of international human rights protections and practice of granting political 
asylum is part of a steady erosion of clear standards of permissible international conduct within 
the OSCE area. Authoritarian global media outlets like RT and CGTN compete with Western 
counterparts to frame news coverage. Government-funded non-governmental organizations 
(GONGOs) drown out the critical voices of actual democratic watchdogs and civil society 
monitors. Regime friendly-election monitors from the SCO and the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) praise obviously flawed elections while diverting attention from the 
assessments of more critical international observers. We are witnessing a similar erosion of 
international human rights safeguards as authoritarians have become increasingly adept at 
rebranding even the most vulnerable opponents abroad as security threats. They target the 
motives and credibility of the messengers, especially international journalist and activists, who 
report and document human rights abuses. And they hire Western public relations firms, law 
firms and lobbyists in an attempt to whitewash their autocratic reputations. 
 
Transnational Repression and Interpol Reform 
 
In these renewed efforts to go after political opponents in exile, INTERPOL has become both an 
arena for countries to contest the politicization of international law enforcement, as well as a 
weapon wielded by autocrats against their political enemies abroad.  
INTERPOL actions or “alerts,” especially the issuing of “Red Notices” and diffusions, have been 
at the center of efforts by autocrats to misuse the international police organization.  Red Notices 
refer to the electronic warnings issued by Interpol’s General Secretariat—at the request of a 
member government—to ascertain the location of a wanted criminal for the purposes of 
detaining and extraditing them to stand trial in the home country. “Diffusions” are the requests 
for international law enforcement cooperation sent by member states to all or a selected group of 
INTEPOL members to assist in the restriction, detention or arrest of an individual who has been 
criminally convicted or accused of a crime.  According to INTERPOL’s own constitution, 
international police cooperation is promoted “in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights” (Article 2), while members are strictly prohibited by Article 3 from undertaking “any 
intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character.” The latter is also 
known as the “neutrality clause” and meant to safeguard the alert system from being abused for 
political purposes.   
In practice, however, authoritarian governments have increasingly violated the neutrality rule by 
designating exiled political opponents as wanted criminals or terrorists. Over the last two 
decades, INTERPOL has seen an explosive growth in alerts, increasing almost ten-fold from 
1,418 in 2001 to 13,561 in 2018- for a current total of over 58,000 active notices worldwide 
(about 7,000 of which are public).13 Improvements in informational technology that have eased 
listing have contributed to this growth, but authoritarian governments have also found that taking 
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advantage of the alert system, as Steve Swerdlow of  Human Rights Watch has noted, is a “low-
cost” way to export repression and extend the geography of their autocratic reach.14  
In general terms, the most abusive governments of the INTERPOL system are autocracies that 
routinely engage in transnational repression. Some attention has been given to the high volume 
of alerts issued by the governments of Russia and China, but autocrats in smaller countries also 
appear to be abusing the organization. For example, Political Scientist Edward Lemon’s research 
has shown that the small Central Asian state of Tajikistan has issued 2,528 Red Notices, 
including targeting the leadership and members of the country’s political opposition parties, 
including Muhiddin Kabiri, the leader of the Islamic Party of Tajikistan which once shared 
power with the government but was subsequently banned in 2015.15 The Central Asian states 
routinely place Red Notices on exiled regime insiders, representatives of opposition parties, and 
prominent civil society leaders and regime critics.16 
Importantly, the repressive effect of INTERPOL abuse does not just hinge on whether a political 
opponent is successfully extradited. In most democracies, properly functioning judicial systems 
tend to, eventually, weed out the obvious politically motivated extradition requests. However 
these alerts still have devastating consequences on targeted individuals: they disrupt their 
professional and personal lives; they can prevent them from travelling or lead to unexpected 
detentions in third countries; they incur costly legal bills and consume time as listed individuals 
await their court hearings; and they make it difficult for listed individuals to conduct banking and 
other financial transactions. Moreover, governments use the very act of listing to tarnish the 
reputations of exiled targets in the media and public sphere, intimidate their family members still 
residing in the home country, and confiscate their properties and businesses.17 Nadejda Atayeva, 
now a human rights defender with refugee status in France, remained on the Red Notice list for 
over 15 years– after she was accused by the government of Uzbekistan of an economic crime 
along with other family members and later convicted in absentia. This greatly hampered her 
advocacy work and travel as she assisted hundreds of Uzbeks with their refugee requests. She 
finally managed to have to designation removed after a protracted legal process. 
Journalists and advocacy organizations, most notably Fair Trials, have spotlighted many of 
INTERPOL’s abuses,18 and the organization has introduced some reforms since 2015, but the 
organization’s continued lack of transparency makes it difficult to assess the progress of its 
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reform efforts and hold its leadership to account. The TRAP Act would provide much-needed 
basic data about which member states issue notices and in what frequency. It would shed light on 
how INTERPOL’s own independent oversight boards– the Commission for the Control of 
INTERPOL’s Files (CCF)– adjudicates complaints of abuses and which member states are the 
most frequent violators. This will in turn allow other member governments, activists and the 
media to identify and track obvious abuses of the international policing network. Finally, it will 
help ensure that politically-motivated abuse of INTERPOL is kept in check and deter other 
authoritarians from misusing the organization.  
Although it may not be realistic for the United States, or any country, to check all of the 
malevolent transnational activities of autocrats and their foreign security services, the TRAP Act 
would send a powerful signal about the importance of maintaining clear international standards 
against the politicization of our most important international organizations. Autocracies will not 
have a free hand to refashion international organizations and redefine basic human rights 
standards and critical political protections.    
 
Thank you for your attention. 
